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1. Introduction
Paradoxes play famous roles in philosophy.1 
Mark Sainsbury’s well-known definition is 
that a paradox is “an apparently unacceptable 
conclusion derived by apparently acceptable 
reasoning from apparently acceptable prem-
ises.”2 Michael Clark has argued that some 
important paradoxes do not fit this model, 
and that hence we should have a more ecu-
menical notion of paradox.3 either way, the 
philosophical import of paradoxes is clear.
 Saul Smilansky notes that, despite the fa-
mous role of paradoxes in philosophy, very 
few moral paradoxes have been developed and 
assessed.4 Smilansky’s point is particularly apt 
if we concentrate on paradoxes about values 
or moral reasons. Some paradoxes that have 
been examined by ethicists concern neither, 
at least in certain formulations. for instance, 
the toxin paradox and paradoxes of deterrence 
have interested ethicists, but their subject mat-
ter is philosophical psychology: by invoking 
scenarios in which agents will not later want 
to do something that they now have reason to 
intend to do, these paradoxes probe questions 
of the nature of and relations between inten-
tion, desire, and knowledge.5 Smilansky offers 
ten moral paradoxes to fill this gap. however, 
Smilansky’s general observation is well-taken: 
despite his efforts, ethicists have not examined 
very many moral paradoxes.6
 The dearth of moral paradoxes is even more 
puzzling given that, in a certain sense to be 
explained shortly, they are easy to generate. 
The present project is to offer recipes for 
moral paradoxes and to indicate their poten-
tial philosophical import.
2. recipes for Moral Paradox
 Two things must be noted about paradoxes 
at the outset. first, the hallmark of many 
paradoxes is a diametrical opposition be-
tween considerations, often leading to mutual 
effacement. There is something at least ap-
parently self-undermining about paradoxes. 
Take the barber who shaves all and only the 
villagers who do not shave themselves. for 
the barber to shave himself he must not shave 
himself (in which case he does shave himself 
. . .).7 Accordingly, to construct putative moral 
paradoxes, all we need are methods of find-
ing this structure of mutually undermining 
conflict of considerations.8
 Second, paradoxicality is a matter of de-
gree. The apparently reflexively undermin-
ing structure of some paradoxes is relatively 
easily explained away, but in other cases it 
stubbornly remains, posing a challenge to 
our preconceptions about the relevant topic. 
Sainsbury proposes a ten-point scale of para-
doxicality: merely apparent paradoxes belong 
at position one; deeply challenging paradoxes 
occupy position ten.9
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 These two features of paradoxes present 
two matters to consider in connection with 
moral paradoxes. The first feature—the 
self-undermining structure of paradoxes—
offers the possibility of constructing moral 
paradoxes. The second feature—degrees of 
paradoxicality—presents the following ques-
tion: for some putative moral paradox, is it 
merely apparent, to be explained away, or 
does it pose a deep challenge to preconcep-
tions about some feature of morality? This 
section contains recipes for moral paradox 
that exhibit various ways of realizing the 
self-undermining structure of paradoxes in 
general. The question of the depth of these 
paradoxes will be addressed in the next sec-
tion.
 There are two axes along which we can de-
sign moral paradoxes. The first concerns the 
relations between the features that undermine 
each other. here are two recipes for moral 
paradox designed around the self-undermin-
ing structure of paradoxes in general:
First Recipe—Paradoxes of  
Independent Structure
Step 1: find something that functions as a value 
or reason with a particular valence.
Step 2: Construct a scenario in which this 
consideration functions simultaneously to un-
dermine the value or reason featured in Step 1 
by generating an independent value or reason.
 These are Paradoxes of Independent 
Structure because the undermining valences 
of the considerations in question have no 
essential relation to each other. Smilansky’s 
paradox of fortunate misfortune can be taken 
as a paradox of this type.10 In this paradox a 
person experiences something terrible early 
in life. Later in life this experience leads the 
person to great success. The same experi-
ence appears to be both good and bad for this 
person. The mutual effacement characteristic 
of paradoxes is emphasized if we think about 
how we should react to this feature of this 
person’s life. It is bad, so it would seem ap-
propriate to regret or to lament this feature, 
even to attempt to diminish its role in this 
person’s life. But this is at the same time to 
regret, to lament, or to diminish that which 
is responsible for this person’s great success. 
reducing the bad simultaneously reduces the 
good; increasing the good increases the bad.
 fortunate misfortune brings up a crucial 
feature of moral paradoxes. The values and 
reasons in question have to be assessed from 
an all-things-considered perspective. There 
is nothing paradoxical about admitting that 
something can be pro tanto bad but overall 
good. We have something paradoxical when 
the same thing appears to be overall both 
good and bad for someone, and this is the 
way in which fortunate misfortune is to be 
understood.
 Let’s look at a second example, this time 
about reasons. Suppose that a particular act A 
is against the law. Suppose also that there is, 
generally and in this context, reason to obey 
the law. In combination, these ideas give us a 
reason not to perform A. Now imagine that the 
government is involved in a morally problem-
atic activity. Citizens have reason to object to 
this, and for at least some, the most effective 
way of objecting is through public protest. 
Suppose also that a particularly effective way 
of conducting such a protest is by well-chosen 
violations of law. In this context, performing A 
suits this purpose. This means that, in virtue of 
being against the law, there is both reason not 
to do A and reason to do A in this context.11
 Both of these paradoxes can be taken in 
other ways. This brings us to the second 
recipe:
Second Recipe—Paradoxes of  
Dependent Structure
Step 1: find something that functions as a value 
or reason with a particular valence.
Step 2: Construct a scenario in which the status 
of the consideration as a value or reason with a 
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particular valence simultaneously generates a 
value or reason that undermines the valence of 
the value or reason proposed in Step 1.
 These are Paradoxes of Dependent Struc-
ture because of the close relation between the 
undermining values/reasons: the first value 
or reason lays the foundation for the second, 
which then undermines the first. In so do-
ing, the second reason/value undermines its 
own foundation, thereby robbing itself of the 
power to undermine the first. But this restores, 
paradoxically, the foundation for the second, 
etc. fortunate misfortune is arguably both 
more realistic and more paradoxical when 
read as exhibiting this dependent structure. 
Suppose that someone has experienced 
something terrible early in life. Because of 
this misfortune, the person works hard in 
particular ways and has great success later in 
life. has the early experience been good or 
bad, overall, for this person? It seems that it 
has been good precisely because it has been 
bad, and that if we deny its negative valence 
then we lose our grip on its role in producing 
and explaining the person’s eventual success, 
which is good.
 here is another example, this time about rea-
sons. Suppose that we generally have reason to 
respect private property, which means allowing 
the rightful owner of the property to determine 
how it will be used, who will have access to it, 
etc. Now imagine that a multinational corpora-
tion owns property near us. This corporation 
is violating human rights in a country on the 
other side of the globe. We have reason to try 
to change this corporation’s behavior, and it 
appears that the means most easily taken and 
most likely to get the company’s attention 
involve protesting by occupying the corpo-
ration’s nearby property against the wishes 
of the corporation. The reason that this will 
be an effective means of protesting is that it 
emphasizes the severity of the corporation’s 
treatment of faraway people by deliberately 
flouting their property rights. If there were no 
reason to respect their property, the protest 
would not be nearly as effective. So, in this 
context, the reason to respect the corporation’s 
property generates the reason to disrespect the 
corporation’s property.12
 Let’s turn to the second axis along which 
we can design moral paradoxes. The first 
axis concerns the relation between the fea-
tures that stand in a putatively undermining 
relation. The second concerns the valences 
of the values or reasons themselves. The 
recipes presented so far contain two positions 
for values/reasons. however, there are three 
ways to fill these positions, and two distinct 
combinations of these possibilities generate 
the self-undermining structure characteristic 
of paradoxes. So:
Third Recipe—Dual Valence Paradoxes
Step 1: find something that functions as a value 
or reason with a particular valence A.
Step 2: Construct a scenario in which this con-
sideration simultaneously generates a value or 
reason with the opposite valence Z, such that 
the value/reason in Step 1 undermines the value/
reason in Step 2, and vice versa.
 These are Dual Valence paradoxes because 
they feature interplay between two nonzero 
valences, each of which undermines the other. 
Situations exemplifying this combination of 
values will be overall equally good and bad, 
or will offer overall reason to do act P and 
equal overall reason not to do P. Because 
two distinct values/reasons feature in these 
paradoxes, the undermining characteristic of 
paradoxes is achieved combinatorially.
 fortunate misfortune is naturally read as a 
dual valence paradox about values: the early-
in-life experience is both bad and good, and 
it is the interplay between these distinct val-
ues that generates the paradoxes. Under this 
interpretation, the first version of fortunate 
misfortune is a dual valence, independent 
structure paradox; the second version is a dual 
valence, dependent structure paradox.
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 Likewise, the independent structure gov-
ernment protest example is a dual valence 
paradox about reasons: the reason to do A 
and the reason not to do A combine to under-
mine each other. however, this example can 
be read in another way. In the dual valence 
version there are conflicting overall moral 
reasons both to do A and not to do A. That 
is, A is both morally demanded and morally 
prohibited. But we can weaken one of these 
demands and still have a paradox. Suppose 
that a particular act A is against the law in a 
particular country. Suppose also that this is a 
just law made and enforced by a mostly just 
state. In combination, these ideas give us a 
reason not to perform A. however, imagine 
that the government is involved in a spe-
cific morally problematic activity. Citizens 
have reason to object to this, and for at least 
some, the most effective way of objecting 
is through public protest. Suppose also that 
a particularly effective way of conducting 
such a protest is by well-chosen violations of 
law. In this context, performing A suits this 
purpose. Given that the law prohibiting A is 
a just law in a mostly just state, it is arguably 
too strong to say that citizens are overall 
demanded by duty to break this law in order 
to protest the government’s immoral activity. 
But since it is reasonable for these people to 
demand change, let’s say that breaking this 
law is permissible. This is to say that there 
is no overall reason not to perform A. on the 
assumption that such considerations can be 
equally balanced, that A is against the law in 
this context implies that there is overall reason 
not to perform A and simultaneously no such 
reason not to perform it. In this version, rather 
than two distinct reasons undermining each 
other, we have just one reason and its specific 
absence. This brings us to the fourth recipe.
Fourth Recipe—Single Valence Paradoxes
Step 1: find something that functions as a value 
or reason with a particular valence A.
Step 2: Construct a scenario in which this con-
sideration simultaneously implies that there is 
no such value or reason.
 These are Single Valence paradoxes be-
cause their paradoxicality is achieved not 
through the combination of distinct values 
but through the curious possibility that a 
feature which grounds a particular value/
reason should also somehow imply that there 
is, simultaneously, no such value/reason in 
the relevant context.
 The government protest example just 
constructed is a single valence, independent 
structure paradox. What about single va-
lence, dependent structure paradoxes? This 
is a particularly tricky category. It is not 
just that some feature implies both a value/
reason and its absence. for a single valence, 
dependent structure paradox, it is the status 
of something as a particular value/reason 
which implies that there is no such value/
reason. Such a structure is arguably the purest 
form of moral paradox. If examples of single 
valence, dependent structure paradoxes can 
be constructed, they will be the most striking 
cases of Sainsbury’s “unacceptable” conclu-
sions possible.
 So, can we construct plausible examples 
of single valence, dependent structure para-
doxes? Let’s work up to putative examples 
via a nonmoral model. The key to the pos-
sibility of such paradoxes lies in contextual 
complexity. one way in which contexts can 
be sufficiently complex is via the deci-
sions of agents about the evaluative status 
of some consideration. here is an aesthetic 
case. Imagine an artist who has been suc-
cessfully working within a given aesthetic 
tradition. This tradition provides standards 
for aesthetic success and failure. Tired of 
old habits and determined to produce new 
sorts of art, the artist decides deliberately to 
discount precisely those features that matter 
by the standards of the given tradition. The 
result has the structure of a single valence, 
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dependent structure paradox, and it can be put 
in terms of either values or reasons. on the 
first reading, due to the artist’s decision, some 
feature counts as aesthetically neutral—it is 
aesthetically discounted—to exactly the same 
extent as it counts as aesthetically significant 
by the standards of the tradition. The more it 
is aesthetically significant by the standards of 
the tradition, the more it is aesthetically banal 
by the standards of the artist’s decision. on 
the second reading, due to the decision about 
this tradition, the artist has no aesthetic reason 
to appreciate or to do exactly that which she 
or he has reason to appreciate or do by the 
standards of the tradition.
 In this case, context provides simultaneous, 
putatively equally valid and, by hypothesis, 
equally important standards by which to 
measure the aesthetic significance of a fea-
ture. Since the application of the standard 
generated by the decision depends on the 
prior applicability of the other standard, a 
dependent structure aesthetic paradox is 
generated. Since the undermining is accom-
plished by the simultaneous instantiation of 
a value/reason and its absence, the paradox 
is single valence. To the extent that the same 
possibility applies to moral considerations, 
single valence dependent structure moral 
paradoxes will also be possible.
 The contextual complexity in the aesthetic 
case derives from the artist’s decision about 
prevailing aesthetic standards. The same 
possibility holds for moral cases. here is an 
example focusing on reasons generated by 
considerations of justice. Consider property 
to be shared between two adults. Given that 
they are related as individuals deserving of 
equal consideration, ceteris paribus, let’s 
say that there is reason to divide the property 
in half. This is to say that the fact that this 
distribution is just provides reason to imple-
ment it. Suppose also that the two adults are 
in a close interpersonal relationship and have 
come to an explicit decision about the weight 
that considerations of justice will have in their 
interactions. Specifically, they have decided 
to downplay such considerations when figur-
ing out how to interact and how to distribute 
such things as the property in question. This 
explicit agreement implies that the fact that 
equal distribution of property is just generates 
no reason to adopt this distribution.
 So far this example is ambiguous. If one 
thinks of justice as simultaneously generat-
ing a reason and no reason, then the example 
presents a single valence, independent struc-
ture paradox. But if one thinks of justice’s 
status as reason-providing as itself undermin-
ing its status as reason-providing, then this 
example presents a single valence, dependent 
structure moral paradox. Again, the thoughts 
of agents provide a way for this ambiguity to 
be resolved such that it is the latter structure 
with which we are presented. Suppose that 
the reason that the people have come to an 
agreement about the status of justice in their 
interaction is that they think that it is detri-
mental to their relationship to prioritize their 
status as individuals deserving of respect and 
treatment qua equals. The stronger a reason in 
favor of a particular distribution of property 
that justice provides, the more it empha-
sizes the abstract evaluative status of these 
people. hence, according to the agreement, 
in such a case considerations of justice are 
to be disregarded to the same degree. In this 
context justice has most reason-generating 
force when it is trivial; the stronger a reason 
it provides, the less reason it provides. This is 
a single valence, dependent structure paradox.
 The crucial feature of this scenario for the 
generation of a paradox is not the agreement 
of the individuals itself, but rather the com-
plexity it brings to the situation. Contextual 
complexity sufficient for moral paradox can 
arise without being directly generated by the 
thoughts of the agents in question. Again, 
let’s start with a nonmoral example. Con-
sider medically therapeutic use of radiation. 
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radiation damages tissue, which is bad: we 
are all familiar with the threats posed not just 
by military use of radiation in weapons, but 
also by exposure to too much radiation in 
medical diagnosis and treatment. Sometimes, 
however—e.g., when someone has prostate 
cancer—judicious and targeted use of radia-
tion can offer health benefits, which are good. 
The health benefits are achieved in exactly 
the same way as the bad effects of radiation, 
through destruction of tissue. This provides 
material for paradox. on one reading this 
generates a dual valence, independent struc-
ture paradox: the tissue-destroying powers of 
radiation are simultaneously good and bad, 
and for at least some people equally so, such 
that undergoing radiation therapy for cancer 
is as good as it is bad. on a second reading 
we have a dual valence, dependent structure 
paradox: radiation therapy is good because it 
is bad. If it did not have the bad effect of de-
stroying tissue, it would not have therapeutic 
benefits for some people. The more danger it 
poses, the more good it can offer in therapy.
 Much the same goes for the moral status of 
sadistic pleasure.13 It is natural to interpret this 
in a way that offers a dual valence paradox: 
pleasure is good, and that an action will bring 
about pleasure is a reason in favor of doing it. 
however, sadistic pleasure is bad, and that an 
action will give someone sadistic pleasure is 
a reason against doing it. When the goodness 
of the pleasure is equal to the badness of the 
sadism, the result is a dual valence paradox. 
What about its structure? To the extent that 
the badness of sadistic pleasure is generated 
by the goodness of the pleasure in question, 
this phenomenon has a dependent structure. 
To the extent that the badness of sadistic 
pleasure derives directly from the effects of 
the activity on the victim, this phenomenon 
offers an independent structure paradox. 
however, in such a case one might reply that 
we are not offered a paradox at all: causing 
suffering is bad while the pleasure is good, so 
the roots of the conflicting values are not the 
same, as required by the recipes. even if this 
is the case, paradox remains, generated by 
the complexity of the situation. Pleasure qua 
pleasure is good, but contexts in which the 
pleasure is taken in causing suffering to an-
other differ from contexts in which pleasure 
derives from morally unproblematic sources. 
Pleasure features in such situations in two 
ways: qua pleasure which is inherently good 
and in close connection with something that 
is bad. Maybe it is too strong to say that the 
pleasure is necessarily bad in such a context, 
but it is less contentious to think that it is not 
good and hence provides no moral reason in 
favor of performing the sadistic activity. In 
cases in which the goodness of pleasure and 
the absence of such a value are equivalent, a 
single valence independent structure paradox 
is the result. Moreover, if the absence of a 
value/reason must be understood in terms of 
the inherent value of pleasure—i.e., if it is the 
case that the pleasure is not good precisely 
because it is inappropriate to have an inher-
ently good experience with regard to this sort 
of activity—then, when these are equal, the 
result is a single valence dependent structure 
paradox.
3. Assessing the Significance  
of Apparent Moral Paradoxes
 The recipes and examples show that it is 
not difficult to generate scenarios that are 
at least apparently paradoxical. All that is 
required is a way of creating or identifying a 
situation which exhibits the self-undermining 
structure characteristic of paradox in general. 
This raises the question of the depth of these 
paradoxes. Are the scenarios constructed via 
these recipes merely apparently paradoxical? 
or are they stubbornly paradoxical, thereby 
posing deep questions about our assumptions 
concerning morality? Just where on Sains-
bury’s ten-point scale do these paradoxes fall?
 Let’s reflect on what these recipes give 
us. Whether these paradoxes can be easily 
explained away or whether they persist will 
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depend on the content of the particular para-
doxes. To the extent that we can use these 
recipes to construct realistic paradoxes, then 
we will have at least constructed interesting 
tools for thinking about values. Note that the 
construction and assessment of particular 
paradoxes requires imagination about pos-
sibilities and suppositions about reality. our 
paradoxes will be realistic only so far as our 
powers of assessing realistic possibilities 
allow. To the extent that we can construct 
real paradoxes—i.e., ones that resist dissolu-
tion through reflective scrutiny—then these 
recipes will have led us to discover what 
Smilansky calls “existential paradoxes.”14 
Such cases demonstrate that ethical reality 
is, in a particular respect, genuinely absurd, 
and the appropriate response seems to be to 
learn how to live with this reality.
 Suppose that we use Sainsbury’s definition 
of paradox: “an apparently unacceptable 
conclusion derived by apparently accept-
able reasoning from apparently acceptable 
premises.”15 The particular cases that have 
been offered as putative paradoxes might be 
challenged on the general grounds that either 
their conclusions are not unacceptable or 
their premises and/or reasoning are not ac-
ceptable. Let’s start with the endpoints. The 
paradoxicality of these cases might be chal-
lenged on the general grounds that we should 
not think of “good” and “bad,” “right” and 
“wrong,” and other evaluative pairs as con-
traries. This line of thought is briefly offered 
by Sainsbury in an exploration of whether 
moral dilemmas instantiate moral paradoxes. 
he denies that a situation in which an agent 
both ought to do something and ought not to 
do something is paradoxical; for a paradox, it 
must be instead the case that such a situation 
makes it such that the agent is both obliged 
to do a particular action and not obliged to 
perform it.16 Such a strategy might work with 
dual valence scenarios: maybe it can be the 
case, without straining our grasp of logic, for 
something to be both good and bad or to offer 
both reasons for and reasons against action. 
however, this strategy is much less attractive 
with paradoxes of single valence structure. It 
is much less plausible—i.e., it is much more 
of a logical strain—to acquiesce in the idea 
that a feature can be both good and not good, 
or ground a reason in favor of A and no such 
reason. Putative examples of single valence 
paradoxes cannot be accepted wholesale yet 
shorn of the undermining structure that is 
the hallmark of paradoxicality. To defuse 
their paradoxicality, something about their 
premises must be challenged. Nor is it clear 
that we should deny that evaluative pairs in 
general are contraries. Take the evaluative 
concepts “good” and “bad.” It is reasonable 
to think that to acknowledge something as 
good, on some basis, is to acknowledge it as 
worth desiring or admiring or pursuing. To 
evaluate something as “bad” is to see it as at 
least worth not desiring/admiring/pursuing 
in this respect, and perhaps as also not worth 
desiring/admiring/pursuing in the respect in 
which it is bad. At the very least, it seems 
consistent with ordinary usage to interpret 
“bad” as implying “not good” in this way. 
If this is correct, then if a feature of some 
state of affairs makes it simultaneously good 
and bad, which is the case in hypothetical 
dual valence paradoxes about values, then 
it is simultaneously and for the same reason 
something worth desiring/admiring/pursuing 
and something not worth desiring/admir-
ing/pursuing. This seems straightforwardly 
self-undermining in the sense characteristic 
of paradoxes. It cannot be avoided by the 
semantic strategy of denying that evalua-
tive pairs are contraries without doing deep 
violence to our sense of the very meaning of 
these evaluative notions. Such change to our 
evaluative notions might be warranted, but it 
needs direct defense.
 What about the premises of these cases? 
The working assumption has been that the 
overall evaluative status of a state of affairs is 
a direct function of the particular contributory 
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evaluative status of the features of that state of 
affairs.17 That is, it has been presumed that we 
have overall reason to A in some situation if 
features of that situation combine to favor the 
performance of A more than the alternatives. 
Likewise, it has been taken that something is 
overall good if its particular features combine 
in such a way to make it overall good. A 
general challenge to the putative paradoxes 
might be mounted by denying that the overall 
evaluative status of states of affairs derives 
from the contributory status of features of 
states of affairs in this way. Such a strategy, 
however, is deeply implausible, at least on 
first reading. Prima facie, this challenge re-
quires that we accept that something can be 
good due to something other than the features 
that, normally, we would cite as contributing 
to its goodness. Likewise, it requires that we 
think that our overall reason to do something 
is unrelated to particular grounds we normally 
cite as reasons in favor of doing things. for 
example, suppose that something is pleasur-
able. Should we think of this thing as overall 
good or as something that we should pursue, 
all things considered? Normally, we would 
cite the fact that the thing is pleasurable in 
our answer to this question. That is, we would 
normally take the fact that something pro-
duces pleasure as contributing to the overall 
evaluative status of the thing in question. But 
if we deny that the overall evaluative status 
of states of affairs derives from the contribu-
tory status of their features, then this normal 
practice is blocked. Given that this way of 
thinking appears to be reasonable, this is not 
a palatable option without special argument.
 In lieu of a general strategy for defusing 
putative paradoxes, specific cases can be 
examined and potentially explained away 
on specific grounds. Sainsbury’s discus-
sion of fortunate misfortune is instructive 
as an example of this strategy in two ways. 
first, Sainsbury misses a central theoretical 
possibility, which leads him to dismiss the 
case as not deeply paradoxical. When first 
presenting the case, Sainsbury follows Smi-
lansky, as does the present essay, in seeing 
the question as being about what to make of 
a situation that appears to be equally good 
and bad. Sainsbury remarks that this need not 
be a problem, as things can be good in some 
respects and bad in others, with no threat of 
paradox.18 he goes on, following another 
suggestion from Smilansky, to examine the 
case in terms of whether the misfortune in 
question nonaccidentally brought about both 
good and bad, and hence about whether the 
event in question could simultaneously be 
seen as fortunate and misfortunate.19 The 
central theoretical possibility that Sainsbury 
misses is that something can be good and 
bad, not just in different respects, but overall 
and equally. Since he examines this matter 
earlier in the chapter in connection with a 
different putative paradox,20 this is puzzling. 
The question of whether the good and bad 
effects are produced accidentally might be 
a legitimate part of attempts to determine 
whether something is in fact overall equally 
good and bad, but unless an argument to the 
contrary is provided, it is unreasonable to 
think that this is a necessary part of such a 
task. Given that Sainsbury misses this central 
point, his discussion of fortunate misfortune 
cannot be taken as conclusive.
 The second instructive feature of Sains-
bury’s discussion of fortunate misfortune 
is his eventual strategy for interpreting 
the paradox and assessing the depth of its 
paradoxicality. The issue on which Sainsbury 
eventually focuses is the question of what it is 
for something to be a misfortune. he formu-
lates a potential paradox based upon principle 
M: “A misfortune is a non-accidental cause of 
predominantly bad effects.”21 he goes on to 
reject this principle on the grounds that some-
thing need not be predominantly bad to be a 
misfortune.22 In short, the paradox is merely 
apparent because it rests on a principle that 
is independently implausible.23 This strategy 
could also be deployed the other way around: 
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a purportedly paradoxical situation could be 
defused by showing that it conflicts with an 
independently plausible principle. either way, 
the principles in question must be assessed 
independently of their role in generating or 
defusing the paradox. otherwise this argu-
mentative strategy will be ad hoc, and hence 
unsupported.
 This strategy is emphasized here because 
it connects the project of the generation and 
assessment of moral paradoxes to debate 
about generalism and particularism in eth-
ics. ethical particularists deny that principles 
have any necessary or central role in ethics, 
whereas generalists place principles at the 
heart of ethics. This link makes moral para-
doxes philosophically significant in a way 
that has so far not been noticed.
 Jonathan dancy is the most prominent 
contemporary ethical particularist. dancy 
defends holistic pluralism about reasons and, 
by extension, values. for the sake of simplic-
ity, let’s focus on reasons. Briefly put, dancy 
argues that anything can be a reason of any 
kind, or no reason at all, depending on con-
text. At the core of dancy’s particularism is a 
focus on contributory reasons.24 A contributo-
ry reason is, to put it crudely, a consideration 
that “favors” or “disfavors” the performance 
of some action. Besides contributory reasons, 
we speak of what we have overall reason to 
do. When we speak of, e.g., having reason not 
to cause pain, we are speaking of a contribu-
tory reason. When we speak of it being wrong 
to cause pain we are speaking of our overall 
reasons. for dancy, we have overall reason to 
do just what is most favored. “favoring” (or, 
correlatively, “disfavoring”) is just one sort of 
moral relevance. Considerations can be mor-
ally relevant by “enabling” other features to 
favor/disfavor without themselves being the 
considerations that favor/disfavor. “enablers” 
(and, correlatively, “disablers”) are the most 
important feature of the immediate context of 
contributory reasons. If context allows, then 
the same property can simultaneously be a 
contributory reason in favor of something 
and a contributory reason against. This will 
happen in complex contexts in which there 
are simultaneously conditions that enable 
property P to favor doing A and conditions 
that enable P to disfavor the performance of 
A. There is no conceptual reason to require 
one to outweigh the other, meaning that it can 
turn out that, overall, in a particular context, 
one consideration can give us equal reason 
both to do something and not to do it. This 
is the stuff of paradox.25 In short, dancy’s 
particularism provides for at least the re-
alistic possibility of moral paradox. To the 
extent that our actual thought about reasons 
is holistic in dancy’s sense, then his position 
predicts that we should be able to discover 
real, existential moral paradoxes.
 on the other side, there is generalism, most 
recently and thoroughly defended by Sean 
McKeever and Michael ridge.26 McKeever 
and ridge think that there is a manageably 
finite number of considerations that can 
function as moral reasons.27 depending on 
just how manageable and just how finite, 
the number of moral reasons might be very 
small. This in itself diminishes the opportu-
nities for real moral paradox. Moreover, as 
generalists, McKeever and ridge think that 
the considerations that function as moral 
reasons have fixed moral valence. This is 
what provides for the possibility of moral 
principles. By the standards of this position, 
it is incorrect to think that one consideration 
can simultaneously really function both as a 
reason for something and as a reason against 
it. Insofar as we seem to encounter moral 
paradoxes, there must be something wrong 
in our descriptions of the cases in question. 
further reflection should be able to reveal 
what we really have reason to do, one way 
or the other, thus dispelling the appearance 
of paradox.
 Let’s return to Sainsbury’s strategy for as-
sessing moral paradoxes. Against the back-
ground of debate about ethical particularism 
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and generalism, it appears to be incomplete. 
Sainsbury claims that fortunate misfortune 
is not deeply paradoxical because he thinks 
it can only be generated by a principle that 
is independently problematic. If dancy is 
correct, however, then there is no need for 
principles to have a role in the considerations 
that generate reasons and values. To defuse 
a paradox and to avoid begging the question 
against moral particularism, one must not 
only examine the role of apparent principles 
in the generation of a putative paradox; it is 
important also to survey the roles of potential 
enablers/disablers and favorers/disfavorers 
without the assumption that there must be 
ethical generalizations to be made about 
these features. Since Sainsbury does not 
examine these, we have another reason to 
see his discussion of fortunate misfortune as 
inconclusive.
 Without dwelling on the details, here is 
how this would work with fortunate misfor-
tune. first, one should specify the common 
good-making and bad-making features of 
the case. That this is common between the 
good and the bad is needed for the case to be 
paradoxical. Then, one should develop the 
case in some detail to shed light on potential 
disabling and enabling conditions. Both the 
favorers/disfavorers and enablers/disablers 
must be described in detail to test for two 
things (at least): that the favoring and disfa-
voring can be simultaneously equally done, 
and that the case can be described in a way 
that is plausible. If the good-making and 
bad-making are not equal, then the sense of 
paradox is greatly diminished. If the para-
doxical structure can be maintained only by 
describing the case in an outlandish manner, 
then the challenge it presents to underlying 
ideas about morality is superficial at most. 
But if we pursue such description of cases 
and discover that the paradoxical structure 
remains, then we have reason to think that 
the paradox is relatively deep.
 So far the discussion has been about the ex-
amination of paradoxes to avoid begging the 
question against particularism and general-
ism. however, the import of the link between 
moral paradoxes and debate about generalism 
and particularism runs both ways. Moral 
paradoxes give us a new tool for evaluating 
the generalist/particularist debate. To the 
extent that we can construct realistic moral 
paradoxes that do not rest on principles of the 
sort sought by Sainsbury, we have the materi-
als by which to construct an inductive argu-
ment for ethical particularism. To the extent 
that we cannot find realistic paradoxes, we 
instead have such a case for generalism. The 
reason should be clear: the particularist tax-
onomy of favorers/disfavorers and enablers/
disablers provides a flexible structure for 
the generation of moral paradoxes, whereas 
the generalist conviction that considerations 
have fixed moral valence works against the 
generation of paradoxes. Much will depend 
on our ingenuity in describing, interpreting, 
and arguing about cases. This will unavoid-
ably engage our moral sensibilities. Sainsbury 
notes that some moral sensibilities might be 
more paradox-prone than others.28 It will not 
do to leave such sensibilities unquestioned 
when generating and evaluating paradoxes; 
they should simultaneously be put under 
reflective scrutiny as part of this process. 
Smilansky’s point is that such examination 
of paradoxes has hardly been done at all by 
ethicists. hopefully, the present discussion 
offers both the tools for doing so and a sense 
that this task is worth doing.
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